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                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-2074
___________
JHONNY ANTON,
                                                             Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A96-203-840)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 1, 2008
Before:      SCIRICA, Chief Circuit Judge, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed:  May 19, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Jhonny Anton petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  We deny his petition for the reasons that follow. 
       These incidents include: (1) assaults and robberies on his way to and from school;1
(2) an attack by a mob of native Indonesians at a shopping mall when he was in junior
high school; (2) extortion in connection with obtaining a government ID card and keeping
his father’s grave from being vandalized; (3) “being trapped in his store during the 1998
race riots for three days while native Indonesians rampaged against ethnic Chinese
businesses, homes, and cars;” (4) the looting of his cousin’s house during the 1998 riots;
and (5) the terrorist bombing of a church while he was attending Christmas Eve Mass at a
nearby house of worship.  (Petitioner’s Br. at 18.)  
2
I.
Anton, a native and citizen of Indonesia, entered the United States in April 2001,
and failed to depart the country when his visa expired in October 2001.  He was then
served with a notice to appear in May 2003.  In September 2003, Anton admitted
removability and filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  He claimed that he was subject to past
persecution, and feared future persecution, because he is an ethnic Chinese Christian.    
In proceedings before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Anton alleged prior acts of
persecution on account of his ethnicity and Catholicism.   He also submitted documentary1
evidence detailing country conditions in Indonesia, including State Department country
and religious freedom reports.  In an oral decision, the IJ determined that Anton was
ineligible for asylum because his request was untimely and he failed to establish the
extraordinary or changed circumstances necessary to excuse his delay.  The IJ also denied
Anton’s further requests for withholding of removal and CAT relief. 
The BIA dismissed Anton’s appeal, finding “no reversible error in the [IJ’s]
3conclusion that [Anton] failed to show that his life or freedom would more likely than not
be threatened on account of a protected ground if he were removed to his native country.” 
(AR000002 (citations omitted).)  The BIA further concluded that the various acts of
mistreatment described by Anton are not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution, or
to establish a “pattern or practice” of persecution against Chinese Christians in Indonesia. 
Finally, the BIA determined that Anton “has not shown that the [IJ] erred in concluding
that he failed to prove that he more likely than not faces ‘torture’” for purposes of CAT
relief.  (Id.)  
Anton filed a timely petition for review.
 II.
We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Because the
BIA concurred with the findings made by the IJ and then added its own supplemental
reasoning, we review both the BIA’s order and the IJ’s decision.  See Jarbough v.
Attorney General, 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III.
Anton challenges the denial of his requests for withholding of removal and CAT
relief on the grounds that: (1) the past incidents of mistreatment he suffered are
sufficiently severe to constitute persecution; (2) the State Department religious freedom
reports demonstrate a “pattern or practice” of persecution against ethnic Chinese
Christians in Indonesia; (3) the IJ violated his procedural due process rights by failing to
       The IJ denied Anton’s request for asylum as untimely, concluding that he failed to2
satisfy the changed or extraordinary circumstances standard for a late application.  8
U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (D).  An administrative determination that an asylum
application was untimely is generally unreviewable by this Court.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). 
In any case, Anton did not challenge the timeliness determination in either his appeal to
the BIA or to this Court.  
4
review the documentary evidence in the record, especially the State Department’s reports
regarding Indonesia; and (4) the reports likewise establish a clear probability that he
would be subject to conduct amounting to torture if returned to Indonesia.  His various
contentions, however, must be rejected.       2
1.
We consider first whether substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Anton
did not suffer past persecution.  See Jarbough, 483 F.3d at 191.  There is adequate
evidentiary support to find that the unfortunate acts described by Anton are insufficiently
severe to constitute past persecution.  As the BIA expressly recognized, “the concept of
persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or
even unlawful or unconstitutional.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Accordingly, mere criminal conduct, such as simple robbery, does not ordinarily
constitute persecution.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005). 
2.
Anton also contends that he was entitled to withholding of removal because there
exists a “pattern or practice” of persecution against ethnic Chinese Christians.  See 8
5C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).  While it is true that 2005 State Department religious freedom
report for Indonesia (the most recent such report in the record) refers to continuing acts of
violence against Christians by various private actors, and notes that the government
occasionally tolerates such conduct, it is clear that the record contains substantial
evidence to support the IJ and BIA’s conclusions that such acts do not rise to the level of
a “pattern or practice” of persecution.  The 2005 religious freedom report found that the
Indonesian government generally respected freedom of religion; Catholicism was an
officially recognized faith; most of the population continued to enjoy a high degree of
religious freedom; and notable advances in religious tolerance and cooperation occurred
over the reporting period.  The 2005 State Department country report similarly states that
instances of anti-Chinese discrimination declined during the reporting period and that
recent reforms increased religious and cultural freedoms for Indonesians who are Chinese
Christians.  Consequently, it is clear that the denial of Anton’s withholding of removal
“practice or pattern” claim was supported by substantial evidence.
3.
Anton further asserts that the IJ and BIA violated his right to procedural due
process.  He contends that the IJ and BIA failed to review the documentary evidence in
the record (in particular, the State Department reports) and did not properly consider his
“pattern or practice” claim, and as such did not provide him with the “individualized
determination of his interests” that due process requires.  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d
       The fact that the BIA and the IJ considered Anton’s “pattern or practice” claim3
distinguishes this case from our ruling in Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627 (3d Cir.
2006), in which we held that the IJ erred in failing to even consider the petitioners’ claim
of a “pattern or practice” of persecution against Chinese Christians in Indonesia.  Id. at
637.   
6
542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).  To prevail on such a claim, Anton must demonstrate “substantial
prejudice.”  Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2006).  
A review of the record reveals that both the BIA and the IJ appropriately took into
account Anton’s documentary evidence.  The IJ, in addition to noting the various State
Department reports submitted by Anton as exhibits, emphasized that “the Department of
State report reflects that, while there were many laws discriminating against Chinese in
the past, many of these discriminatory laws have been abolished” and that “conditions for
ethnic Chinese, while not perfect, certainly have improved.”  (AR000108.)   The BIA
stated that it did not wish to diminish the “seriousness” of discrimination encountered by
Anton and “similarly situated ethnic Chinese individuals” and then cited this Court’s
ruling in Lie as “finding no pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese Christians
in Indonesia.”  (AR000003.)  Moreover, Anton was accorded both a meaningful
opportunity to be heard as well as an “individualized determination” based on the actual
record in this case.   See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549-50 (3d Cir. 2001). 3
Consequently, Anton cannot show “substantial prejudice,” and his due process claim must
fail.
4.
7Finally, the denial of Anton’s claim for relief under the CAT is also supported by
substantial evidence.  For an act to constitute “torture” under the convention, it must,
among other things,  “caus[e] severe physical or mental pain or suffering.”  Auguste v.
Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  As the BIA
noted, Anton “has not claimed that he was tortured in the past or pointed to any reason
why he would be singled out for torture by or with the acquiescence of the Indonesian
government.”  (AR000003.)  Accordingly, his torture claim must likewise be rejected.       
        IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.
